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True pleasure, then, is not so much that which is, as a matter of fact, done for its own sake, but is rather that which, all things being considered should be done for its own sake. How we are to determine this "should be" is another question, and one which is no part of our immediate task.

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DR. GOLDENWEISER AND HISTORICAL INDETERMINISM

OF Dr. Goldenweiser's "Set of Categories for an Introduction to Social Science" the most significant to a philosopher must be his pair "deterministic" and "accidental." If one's philosophy depends in some measure on the results garnered by the sciences, and if the social sciences find themselves compelled to interpret cultural history by the latter of these two categories, then it would seem that the ideal of a completely knit universe, however attractive it may be, is not confirmed by scientific evidence. In the inorganic realm, even perhaps in the field of biology, that ideal may be approximately verified, but in the arena of human culture it would appear to be too narrow and one-sided to be philosophically valid. At least, this conclusion is just if these categories are taken seriously and objectively. I do not forget that Dr. Goldenweiser is careful to define "accidental" so as to imply no real indeterminism;¹ he adheres to a philosophic platform which would not permit that (*cf.* pp. 564-565). I mean only that if the reader were to neglect the author's philosophy and attend to his scientific results alone, and use those results to build up a philosophy, he would have one which, admitting on the whole a system and order, yet allowed a certain free play and spontaneity of action between the parts. For the author shows most cogently that social science can not proceed (as apparently physics and chemistry can do) without using the concept of "accidental" as well as "deterministic." It needs both. He says at the end of his papers "thus the accidental and the deterministic appear as two inseparable ingredients of the historic process" (p. 607). And if that is so, then the one category should be granted as good an objective status as the other. There appears no reason why the philosophy of human culture should adopt the one, and relegate the other to the limbo of superstition.

Let us trace the course of the exposition as it brings out the inevitableness and the significance of both "deterministic" and "accidental" factors in cultural history.

In contrast with those who would see in history no laws, but only

¹ This JOURNAL, Vol. XV., p. 565.

unique individual processes or acts, he declares that it is useful to align cultural processes in deterministic series: "an analytical separation for heuristic purposes of the deterministic from the accidental factors in history, tends to throw a great deal of light on the proper sphere of each, as well as on their interrelations" (p. 590). Examples of determinism are: the survival of an institution whose emotional or intellectual content is lost, *e. g.*, "marriage by capture, which from a grim reality becomes a mere puzzling symbol, or magical rites which evolve into children's games, or prayers which are not even suggested by a set of nonsense words" (p. 592), *etc.* "The principle of division of labor also belongs here. Take a group of individuals with certain tasks to perform, and sooner or latter specialization . . . and division of labor will set in" (p. 592). Or again: "Development in a certain direction will often continue, according to the principle of inertia or the line of least resistance, until a physical limit is reached or a psychological limit, which makes the situation absurd or self-defeating; then reaction sets in, 'opposite' developments come into favor, the pendulum swings back, perhaps only to return with a similar exaggerated sweep" (p. 593). There are also "tendencies which spring from the coexistence and coordinated functioning, in varied situations, of individuals in different degrees of socialization. Illustrative of such principles is, for instance, the universal emergence at all times and in all societies of leaders, strong men, dominant personalities, with reference to whom the remainder of a group appears as followers, inferiors, supporters, disciples" (p. 599). (Dr. Goldenweiser's account is full of interesting examples.) Now it seems as if we might well call these "determinisms" by the sacred name of law.

But these laws are not rigid in the sense that they allow much prediction; "the determinisms do not, in themselves, constitute a guarantee that anything further will happen" (p. 596); they only assure us that "if anything further happens . . . it will be one of a more or less restricted set of events, inventions, ideas, or it will fall within the limits of a certain range of possibilities" (*ibid.*). In spite of this hypothetical character, the reader can find no ground for refusing the full dignity of law to these "tendencies;" inasmuch as all law, even in the exact sciences, is confessedly hypothetical.

Having then to all intents and purposes defended the category of law in history, the author goes on to establish the counter-category, accident. Once more he warns us that he means by it no uncaused factor: "an accidental event or thing is one normally belonging to another system of preferential relations than that in which it makes its appearance in the particular instance; from the standpoint of the latter system the event or thing is accidental" (p. 599). Thus

“from the standpoint of the North African natives the advent of Mohammedanism was an accident; so also was the Spanish introduction of the horse among the Indians of the Plains . . .,” *etc.* (p. 599). After further illustrations we come to the most interesting case, that of the relation between the individual and his environment. The accidental quality of the individual consists in the fact that, though a reflection of the cultural *milieu*, he is a *selected* reflection; he has “congenital capacities and limitations” which enable him to participate in some aspects, and make him “powerless to assimilate” others, of that *milieu*. Also “the reaction of the individual to any particular cultural material which confronts him depends on his attention, interest, his assimilative readiness, the value or significance which the new item of experience has for his *ego*, all of which factors again depend on the totality of his past experience, on his biographical *ego*, on the particular and unique configuration of the psychic individual as a historic complex *sui generis*. . . . Thus, the individual emerges as a highly adventitious aggregate of psychic elements and dispositions, unique and unforeseeable, except in its most general aspects” (p. 602). And “the ingress of the individual as cause into culture as content, or history as process, must therefore always appear as the crossing of two relatively independent systems, and the exact time, place and purport of that crossing must be recognized as accidental, as unforeseeable, except within certain most general limits. While this would be so even though the individual were nothing but the exact replica of his culture, the fact that this is precisely what the individual is not stands for the added significance and the ever indeterminate possibilities of his breaking into the chain of historic events” (*ibid.*). Now let us recall that according to Dr. Goldenweiser—and I think he is right—the individual is not a process or entity *outside* his cultural environment, but quite within it; does it not follow that that *milieu* contains *within itself* as many fortuitous processes as there are unique individuals? He says: “Unquestionably, the specific content of the individual psyche is derived from the cultural *milieu*—where else, indeed, should it come from?” (p. 601)? Accordingly, that *milieu* would appear to be a complex process containing many contingent factors, as well as general tendencies following certain laws; and these contingent factors are not due to the crossing of that culture with systems external to it, but to its own constituent elements (individual persons). This impression is confirmed by his later words. “The driving power, the ‘yeast’ of history, is supplied by various accidental factors, in origin individual, or socio-psychological, at any rate, external to a given system. Not that these accidental factors must of necessity fall into the ‘foreign contact’ group. If the culture is at all complex, the processes of cul-

tural self-fertilization through interactions between smaller systems included in the cultural group or nation are quite adequate to supply the 'yeast' themselves. Among these smaller systems the individual is one . . ." (p. 605). The action of this yeast he compares to "the breath of life, whipping into shape the heretofore unrealized possibilities of the deterministic tendencies. . . . Thus the accidental appears, after all, as predominant in history, when it comes to the particular *when, where, how*, and even *what*, of events. The concept of the 'uniqueness of historic events' is thus vindicated" (p. 605). The accidental or contingent is found in "the maturing of certain elements *within* a system" (*ibid.*, italics are mine). "But withal there is no denying the overwhelming weight of accidental factors" (p. 606).

Although he probably would not grant it, has not Dr. Goldenweiser here given us the best scientific evidence for a philosophic indeterminism (in this field only, of course)? The inevitableness and significance of "unforeseeable" novelties cropping up *within* a social system, and therefore neither determined from without nor (by his definition) resulting from that system itself—the inevitableness and the significance of the accidental factors appears, as we read through his discussion, with steadily increasing clearness. Quite apart from the genuine merit of his discussion as a contribution to the philosophy of science, this result should engage the serious attention of philosophers.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Moral Values: A Study of the Principles of Conduct. WALTER GOODNOW EVERETT. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1918. Pp. xiii + 439.

Professor Everett's *Moral Values* suggests an old conundrum, *mutatis mutandis*: When is a text-book not a text-book? The answer, of course, being: When it is really readable; when it has movement and unity and other things that according to the best principles of rhetoric make for vital interest; when it lacks obvious method and arrangement; when, finally, it lives, instead of just presents, its subject. A text-book thus not a text-book is what Professor Everett has both consciously planned, to judge from his Preface, and with more than ordinary success really accomplished, to judge from the dozen, baker's dozen—in the good old times!—chapters that follow. In fact, except for an occasional excess of the